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Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of an editing phase and studies the com-
pliance of subjects' behaviour with the most popular multiattribute decision rules.
We observed that our data comply well with the existence of an editing phase,
at least if we allow for a natural error rate of some 25%. We also found a satis-
factory performance of certain groups of subjects for the conjunctive rule, for the
elimination{by{aspects rule, for the majority rule, and for the maximin rule. Our
data suggest, however, rejection of the prominence hypothesis and of the maximax
rule. Thus, our experiment sheds light on the existence of an editing phase and on
the use of various multiattribute decision rules.
Keywords: Sequential Decision Making, Editing Phase, Prominence Hypothe-
sis, Elimination-by-Aspects Hypothesis, Conjunctive Decision Rule, Majority Rule,
Multiattribute Decision Making.
Journal of Economic Literature classication: C91, D46, D80, A14.
1 Introduction
When we designed an experiment of sequential decision making to empirically investigate
whether subjects satisfy the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, we became
increasingly suspicious of the usefulness of distinguishing between static and dynamic de-
cision models. For a long time, psychologists have stressed that a single decision is the
result of perceptual, emotional and cognitive processes, which all contribute to a dynamic
process in which the decision maker seeks and evaluates information sequentially1. This
insight led us soon to the question which decision rules are observed by subjects, or, to
put it more precisely, which decision rules are not at variance with subjects' decisions.
Fortunately, our experiment equipped us generously with data, which allowed us to em-
bark on this research. In particular, we investigate the existence of an editing phase in
which dominated alternatives are eliminated. Furthermore, we test several multiattribute
decision rules for their explanatory power of consistency with subjects' choices.
Section 2 develops the theoretical underpinning of our paper. It starts by explaining
the dynamics of decision making through decision makers' eort to minimize cognitive
eort. Then we proceed to review the most important multiattribute decision rules.
Section 2.3 examines whether decision processes are multi{phased.
Section 3 gives a detailed description of our experiment, and Section 4 contains the
results of our study. Section 4 parallels Section 2 in its structure to facilitate the com-
parison of more theoretical considerations with the empirical evidence of our experiment.
Section 5 concludes.
2 How to Simplify Decision Problems
2.1 Minimizing Cognitive Eort
A decision maker's task of seeking, gathering and evaluating information involves a con-
siderable cognitive eort or cost of thinking2. As dierent decision rules may require
dierent amounts of cognitive eort, decision makers who try to minimize the amount of
cognitive eort will, during the decision process, tend to apply simpler rules before they
try rules which require more cognitive eort3.
Now, which decision rules can be assumed to be simpler rules in multiattribute de-
cision making? Multiattribute decision rules can be divided into noncompensatory or
noncommensurable and compensatory or commensurable decision rules. The distinction
between these types of decision rules is straightforward. Under a noncompensatory rule,
the abundance in some attribute cannot compensate for the deciency in another. Under
1Cf., e.g., Montgomery and Svenson (1976), 283; Svenson (1979), 86.
2For an interesting theory of the cost of thinking cf. Shugan (1980). The cost of optimization was
analysed by Conlisk (1988). Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1982) and Harrison (1994) have blamed
experimental economists for insucient rewards used in their experiments, which were not attractive
enough to compensate subjects for their decision cost. They argue that insucient rewards could have
been the cause for much observed falsication of correct theories. For a fully{edged model of decision
costs and subjects' performance in experiments cf. Smith and Walker (1993).
3Montgomery and Svenson (1976), 288f.; Svenson (1979), 107; Shugan (1980), 100; Russo and Dosher
(1983).
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a compensatory rule, trade os among all attributes must be dened. A compensatory
rule must state exactly which improvement in attribute k of a choice alternative just
compensates for a given deterioration in attribute ` to keep the respective choice alter-
native equally attractive. Therefore, the attractiveness of a choice alternative under a
compensatory decision rule is usually addressed as its utility4.
Empirical work supports the \general conclusion that subjects nd it rather dicult to
weight and `trade o' values in a compensatory manner. : : : information that does not re-
quire `in the head' transformation is preferred in the interest of cognitive economy.5" This
empirical evidence has induced Slovic and MacPhillamy to suggest a common{dimension
eect stating that attributes are weighted more heavily in the comparison of choice al-
ternatives when they are common. On grounds of minimizing cognitive eort, subjects
eschew making transformations of information prior to its use6.
When trying to minimize cognitive eort, the decision makers may, of course, use
a plurality of decision rules7 rather than following the prescript of utility maximization
as has been assumed by mainstream microeconomics. Empirical evidence has shown
that some of the decision rules applied are used subconsciously and cannot easily be
communicated8, which, however, does not invalidate the use of a plurality of decision
rules.
Empirical research has shown that decision makers apply decision rules sequentially in
order of increasing cognitive eort. This means that they use rst noncompensatory rules
to whittle down the number of choice alternatives by eliminating alternatives, thereby
simplifying the decision task considerably. Compensatory decision rules are subsequently
used to analyse the simplied decision problem. Indeed, noncompensatory rules are ap-
plied to decision problems with many alternatives whereas compensatory rules dominate
in decision problems with only few choice alternatives9. Let us illustrate this with a
quotation of Payne. He argues that \the less cognitively demanding decision procedures,
conjunctive and elimination{by{aspects, might be called early in the decision process as
a way of simplifying the decision task by quickly eliminating alternatives until only a few
alternatives remained as choice possibilities. The subject might then employ one of the
more cognitively demanding choice procedures . . . 10" Many other authors have followed
him in perceiving individual choice procedures as multi{staged processes11.
These considerations describe nothing more than a general pattern of sequential deci-
4Montgomery and Svenson (1976), 285.
5Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974), 193.
6Cf., e.g., Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974); Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968); Payne and Braunstein
(1971). Notice that Slovic and MacPhillamy's common{dimension eect is similar to Slovic and Lichten-
stein's compatibility eect.
7Keen (1977), 33.
8Cf. Bem (1972); Nisbett and Wilson (1977); Fischho, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1980). Contrary to
these views cf. Smith and Miller (1978) and White (1980).
9Cf. Payne (1976), 382; Russo and Dosher (1983); Johnson and Meyer (1984).
10Payne (1976), 384f.; cf. also Payne (1982), 398f.
11Cf., e.g., Simon (1955); MacCrimmon (1968b); Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theorêt (1976); Mont-
gomery and Svenson (1976); Nisbett and Wilson (1977); Wright and Barbour (1977); Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), 274.; Svenson (1979); Tversky and Sattah (1979), 542f.; Shugan (1980); Montgomery
(1983), 350.; Russo and Dosher (1983); Dawes (1988), chapter 4; Tversky, Sattah and Slovic (1988),
372.
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sion making. Subjects may, however, follow dierent decision rules. Some subjects may
be more attracted by particular decision rules, others may be more attracted by others.
In this study, we investigate rst whether decision processes are multi{phased where a
rough screening applies at the outset of a decision problem, and second which decision
rules are capable of explaining the actual decisions of palpable groups of subjects.
In the rest of this section, we will rst consider a menu of rules for multiattribute
decision making. Then we shall investigate whether individual decision processes indeed
consist of several phases which can be clearly discerned.
2.2 A Menu of Decision Rules
In this section we shall concisely characterize the most important multiattribute decision
rules12. As to the notation, let A := fai j i = 1; 2; : : : ; ng denote the set of decision
alternatives ai, let D := fdk j k = 1; 2; : : : ;Kg denote the set of attributes, and let
aik denote the level of attribute k in the decision alternative i. A decision alternative
is thus dened by a vector of attribute levels, i.e. ai = (ai1; ai2; : : : ; aiK). Moreover, let
ai > aj denote that all components of ai are greater than the respective components of aj,
ai >= aj that no component of aj is greater than the respective component of ai, and let
ai  aj denote that (ai >= aj)&:(ai = aj). The weak preference relation between choice
alternatives is denoted by  ,  and  being its asymmetric and symmetric components.
For A0  A; E(A0) denotes the set of alternatives which have not been eliminated by
some decision rule.
2.2.1 Noncompensatory Decision Rules
The most important noncompensatory decision rules are the dominance rule, the con-
junctive rule, the disjunctive rule, and the lexicographic rule with its variations.
(1) Dominance rule:
ai  aj ) ai  aj;
E(A) = fai 2 A j 9j aj : aj  aig:
The dominance rule declares ai as superior to aj, if aj has no better attribute level
than ai, but ai outperforms aj with respect to at least one attribute. The dominance
rule provides for pruning the set of feasible choice alternatives by eliminating those choice
alternatives which happen to be dominated by some other choice alternatives. It seems
to be a generally{agreed{upon decision rule. Notice, however, that it can (save for rather
special causes) only shrink the set of viable choice alternatives without being able to single
out a best one.
(2) Conjunctive rule:
ai >= c and 9 k such that ajk < ck ) ai  aj;
12Cf., e.g., Coombs and Kao (1955); Coombs (1964); Dawes (1964); Montgomery and Svenson (1976),
285.; Fishburn (1978); Svenson (1979), 89.; Shugan (1980), 100.
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E(A) = fai 2 A j ai >= cg;
where c = (c1; c2; : : : ; cK) is a vector of minimum attribute levels to be satised by eligible
choice alternatives. A conjunctive rule is thus a multidimensional generalization of the
satiscing principle suggested by Simon (1955). It requires any eligible choice alternative
to satisfy certain minimum standards for all attributes.
In other words, this means that a conjunctive rule evaluates choice alternatives on
their least relevant attributes. Dawes has provided a good instance for a conjunctive rule:
\For example, in order to stay alive an individual must have every vital organ functioning
above a certain level (by denition). The fact that a given individual has an excellent
liver, heart, and lungs will not compensate for the fact that a doctor has just removed his
single kidney; an individual may have radically inferior organs, but he will not die unless
one ceases to function above a minimum level. Life or death depends upon one's worst
vital organ.13" Notice that a conjunctive rule can, like a dominance rule, serve merely as
a selection procedure which narrows down the set of eligible choice alternatives. It can,
however, also be shaped as a choice rule which directly determines the optimum choice
alternative. This is accomplished by varying the vector of minimum attribute levels until
only one choice alternative passes all requirements.
(3) Disjunctive rule:
9 k such that aik  ck and aj < c) ai  aj ;
E(A) = fai 2 A j 9aik  ck for some k = f1; 2; : : : ;Kgg ;
where c = (c1; c2; : : : ; cK) is a vector of attribute levels of which at least one has to be
satised. A disjunctive rule thus requires any eligible choice alternative to satisfy certain
minimum standards for at least one attribute. This means that a disjunctive rule evalu-
ates choice alternatives on their greatest merits. If the choice alternatives happen to
be candidates to ll some very special position, then they are evaluated according to
their greatest talents regardless of their other attributes14. A disjunctive rule can, like a
dominance rule, serve only as a screening device which whittles down the set of eligible
choice alternatives. Raising the c's suciently it can also be sharpened to isolate a single
best choice alternative. Then it comes close to a lexicographic rule.
(4) Lexicographic rule:
Let d0 denote a vector of attributes dk; k = 1; 2; : : : ;K; arranged in decreasing im-




aim = ajm; ai` > aj` for all m; 1  m < `;
and for some ` = 1; 2; : : : ;K 0 ) ai  aj;
13Dawes (1964), 105. Cf. also Einhorn (1970), 223; Einhorn (1971), 14f.; Montgomery and Svenson
(1976), 285; Payne (1976), 367; Wright and Barbour (1977), 94f.; Svenson (1979), 89.
14Cf. Dawes (1964), 105; Einhorn (1970), 223; Montgomery and Svenson (1976), 285; Svenson (1979),
89.
4
E(A) = fai 2 A j 9j aj : ajm = aim; aj` > ai` for all m;
1  m < ` and for some ` = 1; 2; : : : ;K 0g:
A lexicographic rule declares ai as superior to aj, if ai has a better attribute level than aj in
the most important attribute for which the attribute levels dier. The lexicographic rule
has spawned many oshoots, such as the lexicographic semiorder rule15, the elimination{
by{aspects (EBA) rule16, the constant{ratio (CR) rule17, the elimination{by{tree (EBT)
and the hierarchical elimination (HE) rules18 (which happen to be equivalent), and the
prominence hypothesis19 (PH).
The elimination{by{aspects hypothesis was pioneered by Restle and Shepard20. Build-
ing upon their work, Tversky developed a theory describing choice as an elimination pro-
cess governed by successive selection of aspects or attributes proceeding in the order of
their importance21. He illustrates this with the following example: \In contemplating the
purchase of a new car, ... the rst aspect selected may be automatic transmission: this
will eliminate all cars that do not have this feature. Given the remaining alternatives,
another aspect, say a $3000 price limit, is selected and all cars whose price exceeds this
limit are excluded. The process continues until all cars but one are excluded.22" Adhering
to the (then dominating) conception of choice as a stochastic phenomenon23, Tversky con-
ceived of evaluation functions of the various aspects (or attributes) of choice alternatives
and modelled the choice probabilities of the various alternatives as increasing functions
of the values of the relevant aspects. As the values of the various aspects are, however,
not known a priori, Tversky chose an experimental design presenting the same stimuli
repeatedly to his subjects.24 This provided him with choice frequencies of the decision
alternatives which he could use for the estimation of the values of the aspects.25
Because of considerable data requirements of the elimination{by{aspects rule, Tversky
and Sattah later developed a hierarchical elimination process which is more parsimonious
with respect to data than the former one26. This elimination{by{tree rule or hierarchical
elimination rule is applicable whenever the decision problem is presentable in the form
of a decision tree in which the decision maker eliminates various subsets of alternatives
sequentially according to some hierarchical structure. The choice behaviour is assumed to




18Tversky and Sattah (1979).
19Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988).
20Restle (1961); Shepard (1964a,b).
21Tversky (1972a,b).
22Tversky (1972a), 285.
23Cf. Luce (1958; 1959); Block and Marschak (1960); Chipman (1960); Marschak (1960); Becker, De-




26Tversky and Sattah (1979).
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main signicance of this model seems to be its greater parsimony with respect to data
requirements. Its basic message is not dierent from the elimination{by{aspects rule.
The prominence hypothesis suggested by Tversky, Sattah and Slovic27 is some
kind of truncated lexicographic rule. It draws on Slovic's more{important{dimension
hypothesis28. Carrying out four experiments, he observed \that people resolve choices
between equally valued, multiattribute alternatives by selecting the alternative that is
superior on the more important attribute or dimension.29" Slovic's early work later in-
duced the development of the prominence hypothesis. It says essentially that the more
prominent attribute will weigh more heavily in choice. This suggests that, in a way,
the prominence hypothesis endeavours to materially establish the preference order of at-
tributes which would eventually dene a lexicographic rule. It seems, however, that the
formulation of the prominence hypothesis has not progressed far beyond the two{attribute
world30. When discussing their results, Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic stress the necessity of
further investigations into the prominence hypothesis: \Although the prominence eect
was observed in a variety of settings using both intrapersonal and interpersonal compar-
isons, its boundaries are left to be explored. How does it extend to options that vary on
a large number of attributes? . . .With three or more attributes . . . additional consider-
ations may come into play. For example, people may select the option that is superior
on most attributes . . . In this case, the prominence hypothesis does not always result in a
lexicographic bias."31
2.2.2 Compensatory Decision Rules
I) Without interattribute comparability
(5) Majority rule32:
#faik j aik > ajk; k = 1; 2; : : : ;Kg
> #faik j aik < ajk; k = 1; 2; : : : ;Kg ) ai  aj;
E(A) = fai 2 A j 9j aj : #fajk j ajk > aik; k = 1; 2; : : : ;Kg
> #fajk j ajk < aik; k = 1; 2; : : : ;Kgg:
27Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988), 372.
28Slovic (1975), 281.
29Slovic (1975), 286.
30Notice that Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988), 376 and 380., use the prominence hypothesis in
conjunction with the compatibility principle to explain the preference reversal phenomenon [for details
cf. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971)]. According to the compatibility principle, \the weight of any input
component is enhanced by its compatibility with the output. . . . For example, the pricing of gambles is
likely to emphasize payos more than probability because both the response and the payos are expressed
in dollars." [376]
31Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988), 383.
32Russo and Dosher (1983), 683, call this rule majority of conrming dimensions.
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The majority rule mimics the old wisdom that more arguments in favour of an alternative
are better than less arguments. It assumes that subjects just count attributes in favour
of the respective alternatives and opt for that one which has more attributes on its side.
This decision rule may violate transitivity and is thus not immune to preference cycles.
This means that there may well exist A0  A such that E(A0) = ;.






fajkg ) ai  aj;










fajkg ) ai  aj;





The asterisks at min and max indicate that the minimization or maximization occurs with
respect to preferences among attributes, because attributes may have dierent dimensions
which cannot be directly compared. Alternatively, we can use (partial) utilities dened
on the various attributes. Notice that the maximin rule is an extension of the conjunctive
rule and the maximax rule is an extension of the disjunctive rule if interattribute level
comparability holds33.
III) With cardinal interattribute comparability






wk vk(ajk)) ai  aj;






where the wk's denote the weights of the attributes and the vk()'s denote the conditional
value functions of the attributes. The linear multiattribute utility rule plays a prominent
role in models of multiattribute decision making34. It has given rise to other developments
33Shugan (1980), 100, neglects this requirement. There is also confusion about this condition in Dawes'
(1964) article.
34Cf., e.g., Yntema and Torgerson (1961); for a good survey up to the seventies cf. Slovic and Licht-
enstein (1971), in particular 677. For later surveys cf. Weber and Borcherding (1993) and Borcherding,
Schmeer, and Weber (1995). For the rigorous establishment of the linear multiattribute utility rule cf.
Farquhar (1977) and Dyer and Sarin (1979).
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such as the use of the Minkowski metric and the generalized mean.
(9) Multiplicative utility rule:
KY
k=1
[1 + wk vk(aik)] >
KY
k=1
[1 + wk vk(ajk)]) ai  aj;





[1 + wk vk(ajk)]gg;
where  is a general scaling factor35. Einhorn has used oshoots of the multiplicative











pretending that these functional forms are noncompensatory rules36. However, inspection
shows that these are in fact compensatory rules. Rather than approximating conjunctive
or disjunctive rules, the former can approximate a maximin rule, and the latter a maximax
rule.
2.3 Are Decision Processes Multi{Phased?
When testing the hypothesis that decision processes are multi{phased, we should prefer-
ably focus on the simplest possible and largely undisputed case. This seems to be the
hypothesis that the rst part of decision processes consists of an editing phase in which
dominated alternatives are eliminated from further consideration. Among noncompen-
satory decision rules, the dominance rule is certainly the least demanding and the most
convincing one. It is not sensible to choose an alternative which is in no respect better,
but for some attributes strictly worse than some other choice alternatives.
This hypothesis was made particularly lucid by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In
their prospect theory, they distinguished two phases in a choice process: \an early phase of
editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. The editing phase consists of a preliminary
analysis of the oered prospects, which often yields a simpler representation of these
prospects. In the second phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect of
highest value is chosen. ... The function of the editing phase is to organize and reformulate
the options so as to simplify subsequent evaluation and choice. Editing consists of the
35Cf. Keeney (1974).
36Einhorn (1970), 227; Einhorn (1971), 3.
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application of several operations that transform the outcomes and probabilities associated
with the oered prospects.37" One of the major operations of the editing phase is the
detection and elimination of dominated alternatives38. Kahneman and Tversky maintain
that \dominated alternatives ... are rejected without further evaluation.39"
These considerations, taken from decision making under risk, readily carry over to
multiattribute decision making under certainty. In this eld, too, many scholars have ar-
gued in favour of multi{staged decision processes whose early stages consist of a screening
phase (preceeding the evaluation phase proper), in which alternatives are eliminated from
the option set following some noncompensatory decision rule40. The most fundamental
elimination procedures in the screening or editing phase should obviously encompass the
dominance rule. As this rule seems to be the only undisputed elimination rule41 in the
editing phase, we restrict ourselves to testing whether an editing phase exists in which
the dominance rule applies.
In the course of our experiment, we, therefore, investigate whether dominated alter-
natives are really eliminated from the choice set. As the possibility cannot be ruled out
that also undominated alternatives are eliminated in the screening phase, we will focus
on searching the subjects' short lists of alternatives for dominated alternatives. Taking
up a suggestion of Farquhar and Pratkanis, we will consider the structure of our sub-
jects' short lists with respect to k{dominated alternatives, which means that exactly k
options dominate the respective alternative42 in a subject's short list. In this terminology,
undominated alternatives are referred to as 0{dominated alternatives.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Stimulus Material
The stimulus was an evaluation sheet of the data of 25 applicants for the position of a chief
secretary to be hired. The subjects were told that they should imagine themselves to be
successful entrepreneurs and, since they were short of time, they entrusted the screening
of the applicants for this position to a professional recruitment agency. The recruitment
37Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 274.
38This assumption is also necessary to immunize prospect theory against violations of stochastic do-
minance. Cf. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 284: \Direct violations of [stochastic] dominance are
prevented, in the present theory, by the assumption that dominated alternatives are detected and elimi-
nated prior to the evaluation of prospects." Notice that cumulative prospect theory avoids this problem;
cf. Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
39Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 275. Notice that the rejection of dominated alternatives has been
stated by MacCrimmon (1968a), 15{17, as his third postulate of rational choice. In this empirical
investigations, MacCrimmon reports some violation of this postulate, but adds that, in the interview
after the experiment, all subjects repealed their violations of MacCrimmon's third postulate, attributing
the violations to \carelessness in their reading or thinking about the problem".
40Cf. the references in footnote 11.
41Montgomery (1983) has ventured to model decision processes in which decision makers apply rst
transformations of the alternatives' attributes in order to render the dominance rule applicable even in
such cases in which there was no dominance in the primary data.
42Farquhar and Pratkanis (1993), 1223.
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agency assigns a code number to each applicant and evaluates the applicants with respect
to six attributes, viz.43:
(i) IQ ... quotient of intelligence dened with a mean value 100, a standard
deviation of 15, and the assumption that intelligence is normally
distributed;
(ii) ST ... prociency in shorthand and typewriting to be measured along
a scale ranging from 1 to 100 points;
(iii) L ... prociency in foreign languages measured as a weighted index
(the weights reecting the needs of the rm) along a scale ranging
from 1 to 100 points;
(iv) AM ... appearance and good manners of an applicant measured along a
scale ranging from 1 to 10 points;
(v) EXP/PROF ... experience and prociency in oce work measured along a scale
ranging from 1 to 10 points;
(vi) COMP ... prociency in working with personal computers, measured along
a scale ranging from 1 to 10 points.
The basic evaluation sheet is depicted as Table 1. It exhibits a simple structure. The
applicants numbered 1 and 2 excel with respect to the rst attribute, where alternative
a1 dominates alternative a2, although alternative a2 is, in general, rather similar to alter-
native a1. Moreover, alternative a1 is 0{dominated (undominated), whereas alternative
a2 is 1{dominated (by alternative a1), so that, when alternative a1 drops out, alternative
a2 becomes a 0{dominated alternative and can replace alternative a1 as some kind of a
similarly structured second best alternative. This pattern is repeated for the six pairs of
alternatives a1 to a12.
Alternative a13, too, is 0{dominated. It is constructed such that the values of all its
attributes are third best. For instance, only alternatives a1 and a2 have better values for
the rst attribute, only alternatives a3 and a4 have better values for the second attribute,
and so on for all attributes.
The remaining alternatives a14 to a25 are at least 2{dominated. All are dominated by
a13 and by at least one alternative of the rst twelve alternatives. For example, a14 is
dominated by a13 and a1; a15 and a20 are dominated by 10 alternatives each; etc. The
dominance structure is shown in Table 2.
This structure of choice alternatives as exhibited in the basic evaluation sheet is, of
course, too revealing in this form to be presented to the subjects. Therefore, we employed
a randomization of the lines of Table 1 and presented an evaluation sheet with randomly
permutated lines to our subjects. (Notice that the chosen randomization was the same
for all subjects.) As we wanted to eliminate biases from data presentation44, we chose
43There is evidence that there is some eect of attribute ranges on attributes' weights in multiat-
tribute decision making; cf. von Nitzsch and Weber (1993). However, we see no possibility to control for
these eects. We could hardly do more than keeping attribute ranges constant for the two parts of the
experiment.
44Cf., e.g., Montgomery and Svenson (1976), 287; Bettman and Kakkar (1977), 234; Svenson (1979),
99; Payne (1982), 391; Russo and Dosher (1983), 677; Johnson and Meyer (1984), 531. and 538.
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Table 1: Basic Evaluation Sheet
Appl. EXP/
No.
IQ ST L AM
PROF
COMP
1 120 70 75 6 8 6
2 118 65 73 5 7 5
3 95 90 67 8 7 8
4 94 88 66 8 7 7
5 97 68 95 8 6 8
6 96 66 92 7 5 8
7 101 72 59 10 8 6
8 100 69 57 9 7 5
9 104 75 72 8 10 7
10 103 73 69 8 9 7
11 108 81 62 6 7 10
12 107 79 60 6 7 9
13 109 85 82 8 8 8
14 105 62 70 5 7 6
15 91 59 62 5 7 5
16 88 81 55 8 7 5
17 79 66 64 7 6 6
18 92 57 80 6 5 7
19 88 63 50 7 4 5
20 96 60 55 6 6 4
21 99 48 52 5 6 5
22 100 71 65 7 7 7
23 102 66 48 6 6 7
24 96 75 51 5 4 8
25 104 62 46 6 7 5
the matrix form of data presentation, as this mode had proved to engender the least
distortions45.
For the second part of the experiment, we told subjects that, after several years, the
chief secretary has been transferred to support the establishment of a new branch of the
rm, and a new secretary was to be hired. As the recruitment agency had performed well,
it is again entrusted with the evaluation of the applicants. For the second part, we used
essentially the same set of alternatives. In order to camouage this fact, we employed a
dierent randomization of the lines, and re{arranged the columns, using AM as the rst
attribute, IQ as the second, EXP/PROF as the third, L as the fourth, COMP as the
fth, and ST as the sixth. We explained the re{arrangement of columns by telling the
subjects that the recruitment agency had changed its evaluation reports so as to enlist
the features which concern an applicant's personality in the rst places, and the more
45Cf. the third experiment of Bettman and Kakkar (1977), as well as Russo (1977).
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Table 2: The Dominance Structure of the Choice Alternatives
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
P
1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 6
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - 2
3 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - 5
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - 4
5 - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - 5
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2
7 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - - - 4
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - - - 3
9 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 9
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 - - 7
11 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 7
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 5
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - 2
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
16 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1
17 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 - - - - 5
23 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0
P
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 10 3 7 3 11 10 11 3 5 3 5 -
1 means that alternative i (line) dominates alternative j (column). The line sums indicate the number of
alternatives which are dominated by the alternative of the respective line. The column sums indicate the
number of alternatives which dominate the alternative of the respective column (k{dominance).
technical properties only thereafter. Moreover, one or two of the previous alternatives
(to be explained in the next section) were deleted, so that a subject was presented an
evaluation sheet containing 23 or 24 of the original 25 alternatives of the rst part of the
experiment, arranged, however, in a dierent order.
3.2 Response Method
Several days before the start of the rst part of the experiment, the subjects were in-
troduced to the problem (i.e., recruitment of a chief secretary) and received the agency's
evaluation sheet (i.e., a randomized version of Table 1). They were told that they should
carefully analyze it and think about a short list of candidates, about the candidate who
should be chosen to be employed, and about the relative importance of the various at-
tributes. Furthermore, subjects were asked to enter their names in a time{table and to
show up at the agreed time for the rst part of the experiment.
The experiment was administered on a computer. The subjects rst entered their
personal data to enable us to join the individual responses of the rst and the second part
of the experiment. Then the subjects were asked to order the six attributes according to
their importance. They could state indierence as well as strict preference. We then asked
the subjects for the short lists of their most preferred candidates. They could nominate
up to ten candidates. Then we asked the subjects to state which candidate they wanted to
hire. After the respective response, the subjects were told that the chosen candidate had
just recently withdrawn her or his application. The subjects should kindly make another
choice. After having done that, the subjects were informed that this very candidate had
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meanwhile accepted another oer and was, therefore, no longer available. They were told
that the recruitment agency had assured that all of the remaining candidates were still
available. The subjects should kindly accept the agency's apologies and make one more
choice. This concluded the rst part of the experiment. It provided us with data on
subjects' short lists and with data on three actual decisions made for each subject.
We then prepared a second evaluation sheet as described above. The rst best alter-
native of the rst choice was the one to be deleted. As we expected a distinct preference
for alternative a13, we deleted also this alternative, if a13 happened to be the rst or
second best alternative in the rst part of the experiment. If the alternative a13 emerged
as rst best, then the second best alternative, too, was eliminated. Then the subjects
were invited to indicate the short lists of their most preferred candidates (up to ten) and
the candidates to be hired with rst and second priorities.
As the second part of the experiment started only some two weeks later46, and, as the
second evaluation sheet was suciently camouaged, we expected our subjects to feel as
if they had to deal with a separate choice problem. The second part of the experiment
provided us again with data on subjects' short lists and with data on two decisions made
for each subject.
3.3 Procedure
The subjects were 45 students of the University of Kiel, mostly students of Economics, in
their third or fourth year.
The subjects were introduced to the experiment on December 15 and 16, 1994, re-
spectively, and received the rst evaluation sheet. At the same time, they entered their
names into a time{table, which allowed them 15 minutes at the computer. The rst part
of the experiment took place in the time period between December 19 and December 22,
1994, which left them more than a weekend to thoroughly analyze the choice problem
before answering our questions. We then processed the second evaluation sheet, which
started from a common re{arrangement of columns and another common randomization
of lines47. Furthermore, the evaluation sheets were individualized by deleting the subjects
rst best alternative of the rst part of the experiment and also the alternative a13 if it
had been chosen as the second best alternative. If the alternative a13 emerged as rst
best, then the second best alternative, too, was eliminated. Then these individualized
evaluation sheets were re{numbered (carrying now 23 or 24 applicants) and were sent by
mail to the subjects' private addresses on December 29, 1994. This left them ample time
to analyze the second evaluation sheet. The second part of the experiment took place in
the time period between January 4 and 6, 1995.
All subjects were promised at least 10 Deutsch Marks as an honorarium for their
eorts of participation in the experiment, provided that they had not given obviously
absurd answers, which would indicate their carelessness in treating this experiment. This
proviso was made with the intention to induce the subjects to undergo a thorough and
46We chose this short spell to exclude major changes of preferences, which would have invalidated the
results gained from our experiment.
47This common basic structure of the evaluation sheets of the second part of the experiment was used
to keep possible framing eects to their minimum.
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earnest analysis of the choice problem before making their choices. Indeed, it had not
proven to be necessary to deny a subject his or her honorarium. We nally paid the
subjects 12 Deutsch Marks each for their participation.
There is a widespread conviction48 that experiments should conform with Smith's pre-
cepts, in particular with saliency and dominance49. Saliency requires that subjects are
guaranteed the right to claim a reward which is increasing (decreasing) in good (bad)
outcomes of an experiment. Dominance requires that the reward structure dominates any
subjective cost associated with participation in the experiment. Whereas these precepts
are largely undisputed for experiments with outcomes with a natural priority order (i.e.,
more money is better than less), it is dubious for experiments in which respecting undi-
luted individual preferences is vital. Otherwise, the reward scheme would distort subjects'
behaviour in favour of the values imposed by the experimenter's reward scheme. This led
us to pay our subjects a xed honorarium. We could have linked it with subjects' eort,
e.g., design it as a xed payo per time unit, but we could not exclude other distortions
of such a reward schedule. As we were fortunate enough to have interested our subjects
in the experiment, and, as we felt that we owe our subjects some reward in return for
their eort, we relied on the combination of subjects' interest and a moderate lump sum
reward. In spite of the modesty of the nancial reward, all subjects participated in both
parts of the experiment, which demonstrates their vivid interest in our experiment.
There is, nally, the problem of the reliability of our data. Subjects are notoriously
susceptible to mistakes and errors in their responses. For instance, \they could misun-
derstand the nature of the experiment; they could press the wrong key by accident; they
could be in a hurry to nish the experiment; they could be motivated by something other
than maximizing the welfare from the experiment per se.50" There have been several at-
tempts to measure subjects' natural error rates51. They suggest a natural error rate of
15{25%, Camerer's 31:6% and Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul's less than 5% being, as it
seems, outlyers. As to the error rate of our data we feel that Table 6 below would provide
some good clues. If we take the failure to choose undominated alternatives in the ultimate
decisions as our natural error rate, this gives us 12
45
= 26; 67%. If we take the failure to
choose alternatives which have been nominated as members of the short lists, we get a
natural error rate of 7
45
= 15; 56%. These two gures delineate pretty well the interval of
commonly recognized error rates.
48Cf., e.g., Harrison's (1994) recent paper.
49Cf. Smith (1982), 931 and 934.
50Hey and di Cagno (1990), 292.
51Cf., e.g., Camerer (1989), 81; Starmer and Sugden (1989), 170; Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul
(1990), 47, note 13; Harless and Camerer (1994), 1263; Hey and Orme (1994), 1296, 1318, and 1320f.
14
4 Results
4.1 Testing the Editing Phase and the Elimination of Domi-
nated Alternatives
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and many other authors52 have claimed that decision
makers approach a decision problem in two phases. In the rst, the so{called editing
or screening phase, they simplify the decision problem, and in the second phase, the
evaluation phase proper, they nally select the choice to be made. One of the more
prominent features of the editing or screening phase is the elimination of all dominated
alternatives.
We shall, therefore, test whether the short lists did not exceed the set of undominated
alternatives and whether dominated alternatives were in fact eliminated by our subjects
in a preliminary phase of solving the posed decision problem. In the rst part of our
experiment, there are exactly seven undominated alternatives (i.e. the odd{numbered
alternatives from a1 to a13), six 1{dominated alternatives (i.e. the even{numbered al-
ternatives from a2 to a12), and twelve k{dominated alternatives with k  2 (i.e. the
alternatives with numbers from a14 to a25). In the second part of the experiment, there
are at least six undominated alternatives, at least four 1{dominated alternatives, and at
least eleven k{dominated alternatives with k  2.
Table 3: Dominance Structure of the Short Lists (Part One)
Number of
dominated Number of alternatives
alternatives in the short lists
in the
short lists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sum
0 0 1 3 2 0 0 1 { { { 7
1 0 0 4 3 3 2 0 0 { { 12
2 { 0 1 0 4 0 1 1 2 { 9
3 { { 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 4 10
4 { { { 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 6
5 { { { { 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
6 { { { { { 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 { { { { { { 0 0 0 0 0
8 { { { { { { { 0 0 0 0
9 { { { { { { { { 0 0 0
10 { { { { { { { { { 0 0
sum 0 1 8 5 7 2 6 5 3 8 45
We have two groups of data to test the hypothesis of the elimination of dominated
52See the references in footnote 11.
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alternatives, viz. the subjects' short lists and their choices made.
We consider rst the subjects' short lists. The results are displayed in Table 3 for the
rst part of the experiment, and in Table 4 for the second. In the columns of these tables
we list the number of alternatives in the respective short lists, in the rows the number
of dominated alternatives in the short lists (irrespective of the degree of domination).
Of course, there cannot be more dominated alternatives than the respective numbers of
alternatives in the short lists, which means that there are only blanks in Tables 3 and 4
below their main diagonals.
Table 4: Dominance Structure of the Short Lists (Part Two)
Number of
dominated Number of alternatives
alternatives in the short lists
in the
short lists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sum
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 -* { { { 2
1 0 0 1 3 4 0 1 -* { { 9
2 { 0 2 4 4 3 1 1 1* { 16
3 { { 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 -* 6
4 { { { 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 10
5 { { { { 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
6 { { { { { 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 { { { { { { 0 0 0 0 0
8 { { { { { { { 0 0 0 0
9 { { { { { { { { 0 0 0
10 { { { { { { { { { 0 0
sum 0 0 4 7 9 5 4 4 6 6 45
* Non{blank possibility for one subject only
Tables 3 and 4 seem to document little evidence of the hypotheses of the existence of
an editing phase and of the elimination of dominated alternatives in the editing phase.
If all subjects would have complied with the conditions of the editing phase53, then we
should observe in Tables 3 and 4 nonzero entries only in the rst seven (six for Table 4)
columns of line 1, which would then, of course, be replicated in the sum line. This means
that the hypotheses of the existence of an editing phase and the elimination of dominated
alternatives are for the rst part of the experiment only consistent for 15:56% ( 7
45
) and
for the second part only for 4:44% ( 2
45
) of all subjects.
We can also have a look at the percentages of subjects whose short lists do not exceed
the number of undominated alternatives. This gives us rates of 64:44% (29
45
) for the
rst part and 55:56% 25
45
) for the second part of the experiment. However, this does
53Remember that this means that the short lists should not exceed the set of undominated alternatives
and all undominated alternatives should be eliminated from the short lists.
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not explain the occurrence of dominated alternatives even within this restricted set of
short lists. We can perhaps interpret it as subjects' inability to correctly identify any
undominated alternative.
On average, we observe close to 2 dominated alternatives in the average short list in
part one, and close to 2.5 dominated alternatives in the average short list of part two
of the experiment. No wonder that applying a Mann{Whitney U{test54 to test the null
hypothesis of the marginal distribution (1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0) against the actual distributions of
the right margins of Tables 3 and 4 rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% signicance level.
This provokes, of course, the question of the intensity of rejecting the editing hypoth-
esis. Table 5 informs us about this.
Table 5: k{dominated Alternatives in the Short Lists
Total 0{dominated 1{dominated k{dominated
number of alternatives alternatives alternatives
alternatives (k = 0) (k = 1) (k  2)
in the
short lists number % number % number %
Part I 282 193 68.44 76 26.95 13 4.61
Part II 289 178 61.59 95 32.87 16 5.54
Table 5 shows us that the intensity of the rejection of the hypothesis of the existence
of an editing phase and the elimination of dominated alternatives is modest. 68:44%
[61:59% in part two] of all alternatives in the short lists are undominated alternatives
and more than 94% of all alternatives in the short lists are made up of undominated or
1{dominated alternatives. These percentages may as well be interpreted as conditional
probabilities that a choice alternative is undominated given that it is a member of a short
list. The conditional probabilities are 0:6844 for the rst and 0:6159 for the second part of
the experiment. The respective pure chance probabilities that an alternative happens to
be undominated is 0:28 ( 7
25
) for the rst part of the experiment and 0:26 ( 6
23
) for the bulk
of the second part of the experiment. These gures lie well below the conditional prob-
abilities, which demonstrates that undominated alternatives loom larger in the subjects'
considerations than dominated alternatives.
The gures shown in Table 5 could indicate that, although subjects aim at eliminating
dominated alternatives from their short lists, their discrimination between dominated
and undominated alternatives is somewhat imperfect, which could then explain that 1{
dominated alternatives count for about one fourth to one third of all alternatives in the
short lists55. Juxtaposing undominated alternatives in the short lists to k{dominated
alternatives (k  1) gives us 31:56% misperformances for the rst part of the experiment.
54Cf., e.g., Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974), 522.
55Notice that subjects' performance deteriorates in the second part of the experiment.
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Although this gure is rather high, it is surprisingly close to Camerer's 31:6% error rate56.
If we allow for an error rate of 25%, this means that more than 90% of our subjects would
truly comply with the editing hypothesis, but were prevented by their natural error rate
from accomplishing this goal.
Concerning the second part of the experiment, our subjects' performance deteriorated.
Now 38:41% of k{dominated alternatives were in the short lists. Allowing an error rate
of 25%, this gives still a moderate inconsistency with the editing hypothesis of 13:41%.
Let us now look at the choices made and at the same time check whether the rst,
second (and third) best alternatives were contained in the short lists. The data is displayed
in Table 6.
Table 6: Structure of the Choices Made
Total First best Second best Third best
number of alternatives alternatives alternatives
cases
undom in SL undom in SL undom in SL
Part I 45 45 45 42 43 38 40
Part II 45 43 45 43 45 { {
It shows that some 85% of all choices, taking all ve choices in a line, are contained
in the short lists. Considering 45  5 = 225 actual choice acts, the hit rate increases
to some 97% of choices being in the short lists. This perfomance shows an improving
pattern: In the second part of the experiment, 100% of all actual choices were contained
in the short lists. We nd, however, decreasing fractions of undominated alternatives as
the best choices when previously chosen alternatives became irrelevant57. For instance,
in the rst part of the experiment after two consecutive choices the best choices of the
remaining alternatives shrink to some 84% undominated alternatives only58.
4.2 Testing Various Decision Rules
4.2.1 Testing the Conjunctive Rule with Endogenous Cuto Scores
As a good secretary should satisfy good standards of all relevant attributes, and as the
disjunctive rule has performed rather unsatisfactorily in other empirical research59, we
shall restrict our interest to the conjunctive rule and to various lexicographic rules among
the noncompensatory decision rules. This section considers the conjunctive rule. Rather
than pretending that some minimum attribute levels have been forced upon the decision
maker by some outside authority60, we are taking up Dawes' suggestion of deriving the
56Camerer (1989), 81.
57Notice that our calculations considered, of course, the changing patterns of undominated alternatives
as previously chosen alternatives become unavailable.
58This inuence of chosen alternatives which become irrelevant is studied in another paper.
59Cf. Einhorn (1970; 1971). We shall see below (Section 4.2.6) that the maximax rule, which is closely
related to the disjunctive rule, performs equally poor.
60This was the way Wright and Barbour (1977) modelled the screening phase of their experiment.
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cuto scores of the attributes endogenously61, following from the decision maker's goal to
whittle down the choice set to a desired number of alternatives which should remain in
the short list for further evaluation. This method can be used to determine a subject's
short list of choice alternatives (and thus model the subject's editing phase) as well as
to determine his ultimate choice if he intends to employ the conjunctive rule right to the
end of his decision process.
Let us illustrate the latter case for 25 choice alternatives and 6 attributes. If the
subject rates all attributes equally and wants to select exactly one in 25 alternatives
according to a conjuctive rule, then he will determine the cuto scores of the attributes




) p = 25 
1
6 = 0:5848 :
This means that the cuto scores begin for each attribute after the 58:48% best attribute
values and eliminates the 41:52% of the alternatives with the worst attribute values.
Proceeding sequentially, this leaves the decision maker with exactly
25  (0:5848)6  1
choice alternative left. Proceeding along these lines, we nd the cuto scores for six




) p(24) = 0:5888;
p6 = 1
23
) p(23) = 0:5930;
p6 = 1
22
) p(22) = 0:5974:
The cuto scores are then gained from the acceptance of the best ip(i) (i =
22; 23; 24; 25) values of the respective attribute values.
Suppose now that the subject has a strict order of the attributes, say d1  d2  d3 




) p = 25 
1
21 = 0:858 :
This gives for the various attributes:
p1 = p6 = 0:399;
p2 = p5 = 0:465;
p3 = p4 = 0:542;
p4 = p3 = 0:631;
p5 = p2 = 0:736;
p6 = p1 = 0:858:
61Dawes (1964), 105.
62If necessary, we indicate the number of alternatives, to which the cuto probability refers, in brackets.
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The cuto score for the rst attribute begins after the best 39:9% attribute values
and ends for the sixth attribute close after the best 85:8% attribute values. This reects
that the subject is more demanding with respect to more important attributes requiring
higher cuto scores. Suppose the chosen alternative becomes invalid. Then, for the next
step of the decision, this procedure has to be repeated for 24 choice alternatives, etc.
If the subject wants to whittle down his choice set to 10 alternatives (forming then
his short list resulting from the editing phase) by means of a conjunctive rule, then he




) p = 0:858 ;
if the subject rates all attributes equally.
Alas, tempting as this model of a conjunctive rule looks, this procedure is not immune
to path{dependency. The short list or the ultimately chosen alternative may well depend
on the order in which the various attributes are screened. Therefore, sensitivity analyses
(applying dierent orders of screening the attributes) are expedient in cases of equally
rated attributes. In cases of a preference order of attributes, this provides a natural
sequence for the screening of attributes.
The path{dependency caused excessive computational eort. For a single decision of
a subject with equally rated attributes we had to calculate 6! = 720 combinations. This
is easily seen: We can start with each of the six attributes, continue with each of the ve
remaining attributes etc., until we have checked all 720 combinations. As this procedure
has to be applied to all of a subject's ve decision, we had to calculate 3; 600 combinations
of a single subject with equally rated alternatives. This immense computational eort
induced us to conne ourselves to investigate the conjunctive rule only for the actual
choice taken, rather than investigating also the short lists.
Whenever a subject chooses an alternative which is at the same time also an element
of an optimum combination, this subject scores a hit. Table 7 summarizes the data gained
from investigating Dawes' conjunctive rule.
Table 7 reports the structure of hits at all ve decisions (denoted by D1 to D5) made.
1 denotes a hit according to the conjunctive rule, 0 signals that the subject failed to make
his or her decision according to the conjunctive rule. All hit combinations which did not
actually occur were, of course, deleted from Table 7. D1 to D3 concern the rst part of
the experiment, D4 and D5 the second. Allowing for at most one error in ve decisions,
we see that the choice behaviour of some 20% of our subjects can be modelled according
to Dawes' conjunctive rule.
Table 7 also reveals some interesting relationships about conditional probabilities. For
instance, out of the 15 subjects which conformed at least twice with the conjunctive rule
in the rst part of the experiment, 12 conformed with the conjunctive rule for their rst
choice in part two, and 7 conformed for both choices in part two with the conjunctive
rule. This gives conditional probabilities63 of 0.8 and 0.47 respectively. This shows again
that a group of subjects look as if they acted in conformity with the conjunctive rule.
63The condition being that the subject conformed at least twice with the conjunctive rule in the rst
part of the experiment.
20
Table 7: Conformity with the Conjunctive Rule
Number of Hits D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Frequency %
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11.11 11.11
1 0 0 0 0 8 17.78
0 1 0 0 0 4 8.89
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2.22
0 0 0 0 1 1 2.22 31.11
1 0 1 0 0 1 2.22
1 0 0 1 0 3 6.67
1 0 0 0 1 2 4.44
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 2.22
0 0 1 1 0 2 4.44
0 0 1 0 1 2 4.44 24.43
1 1 0 1 0 2 4.44
1 0 1 1 0 1 2.22
3 1 0 1 0 1 1 2.22
1 0 0 1 1 2 4.44 13.32
1 1 1 1 0 2 4.44
4 1 1 0 1 1 2 4.44
1 0 1 1 1 1 2.22 11.10
5 1 1 1 1 1 4 8.89 8.89
Sum 45 100 100
Table 8 informs on the hit rates at dierent decision orders. We see that the hit rates
are markedly higher whenever the decision problem is analyzed from scratch (rst and
fourth decisions) and is thus unadulterated from the frustrating experience of past choices
which had become invalid.
Table 8: Hit Rates at Dierent Decision Orders
Decision Order Number of Hits Hit Rate
First decision 29 64.44%
Second decision 15 33.33%
Third decision 15 33.33%
Fourth decision 20 44.44%
Fifth decision 15 33.33%
4.2.2 Testing the Elimination{by{Aspects Rule
Recall that Tversky (1972a,b) modelled the elimination{by{aspects rule in the framework
of stochastic choice theory. Our experimental design, which presents a certain choice si-
tuation only once to a subject (and does not generate data on the full preference orderings
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of all alternatives) does not allow calculations as required by these decision rules. However,
their more basic message seems to be attractive enough to try our best to test them in
some rudimentary forms applicable to our data. We can, for instance, apply a between{
subjects analysis and look for some positive correlation between the attractiveness of
alternatives and the number of other alternatives which they dominate64, or we can apply
some other pattern elimination processes.
Starting with the second approach, we test the elimination{by{aspects rule using an
algorithm which gradually lowers the attribute values and checks at each step whether
some of the actual alternatives dominates these sham vectors. To illustrate, the rst sham
alternative is composed by the best attribute values in each row of Table 1, viz.
(120; 90; 95; 10; 10; 10) :
Of course, no alternative dominates this vector. Then we compose a sham vector using
the second best values of all attributes. This gives:
(118; 88; 92; 9; 9; 9) :
Again, no alternative dominates this vector. The next vector constructed in this way is
the alternative a13, which places this alternative at the top. Proceeding further in this
way, we arrive after some other sham vectors at the sham vector
(104; 73; 72; 5; 4; 4) ;
which is dominated by alternative a9. Applying this algorithm further gives us for the
top ve items the preference order:
a13  a9  a10  a1  a22 :
Table 9 examines the performance of the top three alternatives in part one of the experi-
ment.
Table 9: The Performance of a13, a9, and a10
a13  a9  a10 9 times chosen
a13  a9 at top 15 times chosen
a13 37 times rst; 5 times second; 1 time third
This result is very appealing. Table 9 shows us that the ordering of choices a13  a9 
a10 emerged in 20% of all responses. If all 25 alternatives are considered, this preference
ordering would evolve by chance only with a probability of 0:000072464 = 7:2464 10 5.
64Cf. Tversky (1972a), 295, to see that this is a valid interpretation of the elimination{by{aspects
hypothesis. Many other scholars, too, have found empirical evidence that the addition of dominated
alternatives increases the attractiveness of the now dominating alternatives. Cf., e.g., Huber, Payne, and
Puto (1982); Huber and Puto (1983); Tyszka (1983); Ratneshwar, Shocker, and Steward (1987); Wedell
(1991).
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If only the rst thirteen alternatives are taken as eligible, it still can arise only with a
probability of 0:00058275 = 5:8275  10 4. The ordering a13  a9 at top was chosen in
one third of all responses. Considering all 25 alternatives, it would evolve by chance only
with a probability of 0:0016667 = 1:6667  10 3. If only the rst thirteen alternatives
are considered as eligible, the ordering a13  a9 at top arises only with a probability of
0:0064102 = 6:4102  10 3. This shows that the elimination{by{aspects rule provides a
rather good forecast of subjects' actual choices.
The second part of the experiment was tested separately, because, as a consequence of
error, subjects may have failed to realize a13  a9  a10 in the rst part of the experiment.
Starting their decision process from scratch in the second part of the experiment may turn
out to be more successful. Yet the choice situations may well be dierent. Therefore,
we used the above algorithm to individually compute the best alternatives under an
elimination{by{aspects rule and ask whether the subjects indeed followed the respective
orders, say ai  aj. This is summarized in Table 10.
Table 10: The Performance of the Best Alternatives in Part Two
ai  aj 8 times chosen
ai at top 22 times chosen
ai second 11 times chosen
This shows again results which are far above the realizations which would evolve from
pure chance.
Another way to test the elimination{by{aspects rule is to explore the correlation be-
tween the attractiveness of alternatives (in terms of actual choices) and the number of
alternatives which they dominate. For the rst choice in the rst part of the experiment,
we have no problems, because all subjects are faced with the same option set. Correlating
thus the actual choices of the various alternatives against the number of the alternatives
which they dominate gives a correlation coecient of 0:6037319.
One might surmise that this high correlation coecient is inuenced by the fact that
a13 was chosen 37 times as the rst best choice, and a13 dominates 12 other choice alter-
natives. Therefore, we calculated another correlation coecient, taking the 37 subjects
who had chosen a13 as their rst best alternative as a basis. These 37 subjects all faced
the same option set for their second best choice. Correlating their second best choices
against the number of alternatives which they dominate yields a correlation coecient of
0:6035214, which is nearly equal to the former correlation coecient.
Things become more complicated for the second part of the experiment, because sub-
jects face dierent decision problems. We tried to allow for this by weighting alternatives
for their availability. For instance, a13 was only available for three subjects in part two
and was chosen two times. This gives a ratio of 2
3
. Weighting this for availability gives
2
3
45 = 30. That is, we pretend that a13 would have been chosen by 30 subjects if it were
available for all subjects. This procedure is not entirely satisfactory, as it feigns that there
was a ctitious choice involving (as this procedure works out) some 80 subjects instead
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of 45, but, as a correlation coecient normalizes the gures anyway, we thought that we
should try this approach. We nd a correlation coecient of 0:8215491.
These results show that we observe a distinctly positive correlation between the at-
tractiveness of an alternative (in terms of actual choice) and its number of dominated
other alternatives.
With respect to our results we are entitled to say that the choice behaviour of at least
20% of our subjects is consistent with the elimination{by{aspects rule.
4.2.3 Testing the Prominence Hypothesis
There seems to be no clearcut recommendation as to how to test the prominence hypo-
thesis in a multiattribute decision problem with K attributes for K > 2.65 We are trying
a rank correlation between the alternatives in the short lists and indicated ranks of the
attributes.
As logit and probit do not yield signicant estimates, we employ a linear probability
model of the alternatives in the short lists and the order of the attributes as indicated by
the subjects. The linear probability model is derived from
i = 0 +
6X
k=1
k âik + "i ;
where i is accorded the value 1 if alternative i was a member of the short list, and 0





0 denotes a constant, and "i denotes the error term. Because of heteroscedascity of the
error term we employed a two{stage Aitken (weighted least squares) estimation for the
k's (deleting alternatives for which esti =2 [0; 1] after the rst stage of the estimation)
66.
Then all k's which did not satisfy the 5% signicance level were eliminated (i.e., set
equal to zero). The remaining k's were then transformed into ranks, treating k's which
did not dier by more than 5% as identical. For identical coecients, a mid{ranking
procedure was applied. Then we computed Spearman's rank correlation coecients for
the ranks of the attributes derived in this way and the ranks of the attributes as indicated
by the subjects. This gave us two rank correlation coecients for each subject, one for
the rst part and one for the second part of the experiment.
The result is not particularly encouraging. The rank correlation coecients do not
point strongly in anyone direction. We observe positive, negative, and near{zero rank
correlation coecients. The average rank correlation coecient is 0.3003 for the rst part
and 0.3625 for the second part of the experiment. Using these two sets of 45 individual
rank correlation coecients to compute the ordinary (Bravais{Pearson) correlation coe-
cient, we get a value of 0.0118, which means that there is hardly any correlation between
65Tversky, Sattah, and Slovic (1988), 388.
66Cf. Goldberger (1964), 249f.; Gujarati (1988), 468{473.
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the rank correlation coecient of the rst and the second part of the experiment. Thus,
the rank correlation analysis rejects the prominence hypothesis.
We also tried out two other methods to test the prominence hypothesis with similarly
poor results. Therefore, we refrain from reporting them here67.
4.2.4 Testing the Majority Rule
The majority rule asserts that subjects form their preferences on choice alternatives by
pairwise comparisons, simply counting the attributes in favour of one or the other. If we
have an equal number of attributes in favour of either of two alternatives, the majority
rule indicates indierence. Let us code ai  aj, i indicating the line and j the column
of an adjacency matrix, by 1, ai  aj by 0, and ai  aj by a hyphen, we can form
the priority structure of the majority rule in Table 11, which corresponds to Table 2 for
the dominance structure. From Table 11, we immediately see that, neglecting ties, three
alternatives form the unrivalled winners in the order a13  a9  a10, which compares
favourably with our test of the elimination{by{aspects rule. Furthermore, we see that
the majority rule is plagued by so many intransitivities, that any subject would simply
be lost without having the powerful instrument of an adjacency matrix at hand.
Therefore, we conned ourselves to testing our subjects' internal inconsistencies of
their actual choices. Suppose, for instance, that a subject's preferences for alternatives,
as revealed by his actual choices, are a1  a2  a3 for the rst part of the experiment.
Denoting weak priority under a majority rule (preference or indierence) by R and strict
priority by P, we should expect a1Ra2Ra3 if the majority rule is indeed followed. Compar-
ing these two orders, the rst one being given, we could nd up to three priority violations
for part one of the experiment. For instance,
a1Ra2; a3Pa2; a1Ra3
means exactly one priority violation. Table 12 lists the priority violations observed in our
experiment.
It is interesting to nd some structure in the priority violations of the majority rule.
A probit analysis shows that the subjects with more priority violations in the rst part of
the experiment exhibit a greater tendency for priority violations in the second part of the
experiment68. Moreover, this tendency increases with a rising number of priority violations
in the rst part of the experiment. As to our notation, X denotes the number of priority
violations in the rst part of the experiment, and (+X) gives us the probability of a
priority violation in the second part of the experiment given X priority violations in the
rst part of the experiment, where  denotes the standard normal distribution function.
Table 14 shows that the probability of a priority violation in part two is an increasing
function of the number of priority violations in part one of the experiment.
67Einhorn, too, failed to discover a marked relationship between the ratings of attributes and subjects'
decisions. Cf. Einhorn (1971), 17: \The ratings of importance for each subject for each attribute were
collected and analyzed. Unfortunately, there was no consistent pattern of use for any particular variable".
68Notice, however, that the coecient  in our probit estimate is signicant only at the 7% level.
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Table 11: Priority Structure of the Majority Rule
/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
2 - 0 - - - - - 0 - - - - - 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 - 0 1 1
3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 1 - 0 - 0 0 1 - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 0 1 0 1 0 1 - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
6 0 1 - 0 - 0 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1
7 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 - 0 - - 1 1 - 0 - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 - 1 - - 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 - 1 - - 1 1 1 1 0 0 - 0 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 - 0 1 1
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 0 - - 1 0 1 - - - -
16 - 0 - - - 0 - - - - - - - - 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 - 1 1 1
17 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 0 1 1 1 - 0 0 1
18 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 - - 0 -
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 0 - - - - 1
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 1 0 0 1 - - 1 -
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 - - 1 -
22 0 1 - - 0 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
23 - 0 - - - - - - - - - - - 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 - 0 0 1
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 0 0 1 - - - 0 0 0
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 - - 0 0
Table 12: Priority Violations of the Majority Rule
Priority violations
0 1 2 3
Part I 22 22 1 0
Part II 32 13 { {





Level of Sign. 0.0018 0.0694
Table 14: Conditional Probabilities of Priority Violations in Part Two
X 0 1 2 3
(+ X) 0.1685 0.3936 0.6664 (0.8686)
This obviously suggests that we have two rather stable cohorts among our subjects.
One cohort seems to make consistent use of the majority rule, whereas the other cohort
does not seem to pay particular attention to it. This conjecture is conrmed by Table 15
which shows the violations of the majority rule.
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Table 15: Violations of the Majority Rule
Number of Violations of Conditional Probabilities,
the Majority rule Frequency given n Violations in Part One
in part one in part two numbers % n = 0 n = 1 n = 2
of subjects
0 0 18 30.0 0.8182 { {
0 1 4 8.9 0.1818 { {
1 0 14 31.1 { 0.6364 {
1 1 8 17.8 { 0.3636 {
2 1 1 2.2 { { 1.0
Table 15 corresponds pretty well to the results of Table 14. The conditional proba-
bilities of a violation of the majority rule in part two, given no violation in part one, are
0:1685 (Table 14), and 0:1818 (Table 15). For one violation in part one the respective
probabilities are 0:3936 (Table 14), and 0:3636 (Table 15). For two violations in part one
we have 0:6664 from Table 14, and 1:0 from Table 15. Moreover, Table 15 shows us that
30% of our subjects exhibit a behaviour which is fully consistent with the majority rule.
4.2.5 Insucient Data Base to Test the Linear and the Multiplicative Mul-
tiattribute Utility Rules
Any experimenter must accept compromises when conducting an experiment. Testing the








requires a special experimental design which is attuned to this task.
First, we would have to test for mutual preference independence [for the linear rule]
or for weak dierence independence [for the multiplicative rule] of the attributes69. These
conditions warrant that the vk(){functions can be evaluated independently of the values
of all other attributes. If an experiment shows serious violations of these requirements,
then the linear and/or the multiplicative multiattribute utility rule do not apply.
If the independence requirement is met, the vk(){functions and the weights wk have
to be elicited. The vk(){functions can be derived either by methods of numerical estima-
tion (direct rating, category estimation, ratio estimation, curve drawing), or by methods
employing indierence relations (dierence standard sequence, bisection, dual standard
sequence, sequential trade{o). The weights, too, can be derived either by methods of
numerical estimation (ranking, direct rating, ratio estimation, swing weights) or by using
69For details cf. Dyer and Sarin (1979), 812{815; Keeney (1974).
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indierence relations (cross{attribute indierence, cross{attribute strength of preference).
Selected combinations of deriving the vk(){functions and the weights wk have been given
special names, such as SMART (simple multiattribute rating technique), dierence value
measurement, conjoint measurement, weak{order model, etc.70
Our data base contains just our subjects' rankings of attributes, which can be put to
good use to derive the weights wk, but we have no data whatsoever to derive the vk(){
functions. The data requirements to derive vk(){functions for six attributes are indeed
formidable and require experiments which focus entirely on this task. Although our data
base allows testing several multiattribute decision rules, it is decisively insucient to test
the linear or the multiplicative multiattribute utility rules71.
We also considered making use of the independent multinomial logit model, which has
been used in the analysis of brand choice behaviour. This approach estimates the weights
wk from








where P (ai j A) denotes the probability that the choice alternative ai is chosen from the
set of alternatives A.72 However, this approach assumes that the subjects are homoge-
neous and behave in accordance with the random utility model. As our subjects exhibit
rather diverse rankings of the attributes, common attribute weights for all subjects would
come up to a gross misspecication of the choice model. Therefore, we did not consider
the independent multinomial logit model as a serious candidate to mimick the linear mul-
tiattribute utility rule. It may be appropriate as a description of brand choice, but not
for multiattribute choices in general.
4.2.6 Testing the Maximin and Maximax Rules











The ik's are the values of the attributes of the various choice alternatives, normalized on
the unit interval. The exponents k were derived from the subjects' attribute rankings in
70For details cf. von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986), chapters 7 and 8; Keeney and Raia (1976),
chapter 3.
71Meyer and Johnson (1995), G183f., report a poor performance of the linear multiattribute utility
rule.
72Cf., e.g., Manrai (1995), 5.
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the following way. For indierence between all attributes we used k =
1
6
8 k = 1; 2; : : : ; 6.
For strict preference orderings, we used 6
21
as an exponent for the highest ranked attribute,
5
21
as an exponent for the second highest ranked attribute, etc., ending with 1
21
for the
last ranked attribute. If we have, for instance, one attribute at the highest rank, three
attributes second ranked, and two attributes at the third rank, we applied the exponents
3
11
for the highest ranked attribute, 2
11
for each of the three second ranked attributes, and
1
11
for each of the two third ranked attributes. These examples should suce to clarify
the rule of construction of the exponents.
Table 16 informs on the compliance of subjects' responses with the maximin rule. It
reports the structure of hits at all ve decisions (denoted by D1 to D5) made. 1 denotes
a hit according to the maximin rule, 0 a failure to comply with the maximin rule. All hit
combinations which did not actually occur were deleted. D1 to D3 concern the rst part
of the experiment, D4 and D5 the second.
Table 16: Subjects' Choices Following the Maximin Rule
Number of Hits D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 Frequency % Group %
1 0 0 0 0 5 11.11
1 0 1 0 0 0 2 4.44
0 0 1 0 0 1 2.22
0 0 0 1 0 2 4.44 22.22
1 1 0 0 0 2 4.44
1 0 1 0 0 2 4.44
2 1 0 0 1 0 3 6.67
1 0 0 0 1 4 8.89
0 1 0 1 0 1 2.22
0 1 0 0 1 1 2.22 28.89
1 1 0 1 0 4 8.89
1 1 0 0 1 2 4.44
3 1 0 1 1 0 5 11.11
1 0 1 0 1 1 2.22
0 1 1 1 0 1 2.22 28.89
1 1 1 1 0 5 11.11
4 1 1 1 0 1 4 8.89 20.00
SUM 45 100.00 100.00
Table 16 shows that, while 20% of our subject acted in conformity with the maximin
rule in the rst part of the experiment, not a single subject acted for both choices in
the second part of the experiment in conformity with the maximin rule. Thus, it seems
that the conformity of agents' choices with the maximin rule decreases as the experiment
continues.
How can subjects' compliance with the maximin rule be evaluated when we allow for
some error, e.g. missing the maximin rule by just one alternative. Table 17 informs about
this.
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Table 17: Compliance with the Maximin Rule
Actual Chosen alternative Chosen alternative Chosen alternative
Choices complies with is second best ranks lower than
maximin rule according to second best
maximin rule according to
maximin rule
1st 37 3 5
2nd 22 10 13
3rd 19 10 16
4th 21 11 13
5th 12 12 21
Table 17 shows that, allowing for an error of missing the best alternative according
to the maximin rule but by one alternative, we have a hit rate (except the 5th choice)
of more than 64%. Thus, although the maximin rule is not followed for all of a subject's
choices, our data show that this rule generally enjoys great attention among our subjects.
In contrast, things are not very encouraging for the maximax rule. The maximax rule
involves the choice of the parameter c, where c > 1. Our calculations show us that the
choice alternatives endorsed by the maximax rule are extremely sensitive to the value of c.
For c = 1:05, only 9 subjects are in conformity with the maximax rule for the rst choice
of part one of the experiment. This gure rises to 15 for c = 1:1, and to 26 for c = 1:2. The
hit rate increases sharply with rising c, which reects that greater values of c reduce the
dierences between the choice alternatives by assigning the same maximum value to more
alternatives. Therefore, we conclude that the maximax rule is not a good explanation of
individual behaviour and we do not bother the reader with numerical results of our tests
of this rule.
5 Conclusion
We utilized a choice experiment presented in the context of recruiting a secretary to in-
vestigate whether decision processes are multi{phased and which decision rules are consis-
tent with subjects' choice behaviour. In the most elementary form, mulit{phased decision
processes should manifest at least in the form of an editing phase, in which dominated
alternatives are eliminated from further consideration, and a decision phase proper. Fur-
thermore, we tested whether individual choice behaviour is consistent with various decision
rules which were surveyed in Section 2.2.
We have found that, applying a strict yardstick, the existence of an editing phase
and the elimination of dominated alternatives is not conrmed. We observed an average
of more than two dominated alternatives in the short lists and rejection rates of more
than 60%. However, the intensity of rejecting the existence of an editing phase and the
elimination of dominated alternatives is modest. 60% and more of all alternatives in the
short lists are undominated alternatives and more than 94% of all alternatives in the short
lists are either undominated or 1{dominated alternatives. Allowing for an error rate of
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some 25% implies that some 90% of our subjects would truly comply with the editing
hypothesis, a picture which is only obscured by their natural error rates.
As to the testing of decision rules, we tested the conjunctive rule with endogenous
cuto scores, the elimination{by{aspects rule, the prominence hypothesis, the majority
rule, and the maximin and maximax rules.
The conjunctive rule was tested using endogeneously determined cuto scores to de-
termine the subjects' ultimate choices. We found that some 20% of our subjects seem to
consistently apply the conjunctive rule for their ultimate choices.
We tested the elimination{by{aspects rule using an elimination algorithm which pro-
vided us with preference orderings of alternatives. These tted surprisingly well. Their
good performance ranks far above the random choice probabilities, which means that
the behaviour of a substantial part of our subjects is consistent with the elimination{
by{aspects rule. Trying correlations between chosen alternatives and the numbers of the
alternatives which they dominate (another proxy for the elimination{by{aspects rule)
provided encouraging results, too.
In order to test the prominence hypothesis, we employed a linear probability model
applied to the alternatives in the short lists. Then, for each subject, we computed Spear-
man's rank correlation coecient between the ranks of the attributes derived in this way
and the ranks of the attributes as indicated by the subjects. Our results suggest a rejection
of the prominence hypothesis.
The majority rule, on the other hand, has a remarkably good performance. For
the rst part of the experiment, it yields the same top ranked alternatives in the order
a13  a9  a10 as the elimination{by-aspects rule and, thus, shares its good performance.
Moreover, we found evidence that our subjects split into two cohorts, one complying with
the majority rule and the other one disregarding it.
The maximin rule did remarkably well. Allowing for a natural error to miss the best
alternative but by one alternative gave us a hit rate of more than 64%. The maximax
rule, in contrast, provided rather discouraging results and should, therefore, be discarded.
This shows that our experiment has shed light on the existence of an editing phase
and on the spread of using various multiattribute decision rules.
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